Us Involement In The Gulf War Essays - Kuwait, Gulf War,

Us Involement In The Gulf War United States Involvement In the Gulf War 1990-1991 U.S. Military Strategy OUTLINE Thesis: United States Military Strategy used for the Persian Gulf before, during and after the war was successful and reinforced the U.S. National Security Objectives. I. Military Strategy Equation: A. Shape B. Respond C. Prepare Now II. National Security Objectives III. Approaches to Military Strategy A. United States B. Iraq IV. Military Strategic Concepts United States Involvement in the Gulf War 1990-1991 The U.S. involvement in the Gulf War achieved success through the military strategy that was used. The three elements of the military strategy equation were: Shape, Respond and Prepare Now. (BD 30, U.S. Military Strategy). Shaping the international environment of the Gulf War Crisis with diplomatic and political reasons was uniform. Among allies, especially among threatened allies, the ultimate military test was: will you show up when you say you will? In the post-cold war world, there is only one superpower. Like it or not, Superpower action or inaction when aggression occurs does set the tone for behavior. On August 2,1990 the Iraqi Dictator Saddam Hussein gambled that the Saudis and the rest of the world would tremble, and ignore the tiny emirate of Kuwait that had just been invaded. Saddam reasoned that the fragile Arab relations with the west (United States), weak Gulf Arab armies, the existence of Israel, and his own armies power would reduce resistance to political howls. Ther e was the question of the United States itself. It had military might, but with the legacy of Vietnam, and the frustrating experience in Lebanon, and its dependence on oilwas the time right? Saddam seemed to think so (Bay 26). However; The United States immediate response to the Gulf crisis was sending Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney to meet with Saudi King Fahd on August 6, 1990, four days after Iraqi soldiers invaded Kuwait. The Secretary of Defense assessed the situation and briefed the King on what support the United States could provide. On August 7, 1990 at the direction of the president on the United States, U.S. forces began to deploy to the region. Prepare now. On August 8, 1990 as the president of the United States addressed the nation two carrier battle groups led by the USS Independence and the USS Eisenhower were already on station in the Gulf area (Overseas Presence). Enroute were the Ready Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division, a Navy propositioned F-18 squadron, and F-15s from the Airforces 1st Tactical Fighter Wing (Power Projection). With other forces quickly following. The U.S. National Security Objectives were clearly laid out on August 9, 1990. The four simple principles guided our policy; first, the immediate, unconditional and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Second, Kuw aits legitimate government must be restored to replace the puppet regime. Third, we are committed to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf. Fourth, we are determined to protect the lives of American citizens abroad (Qtd. in summers 175). The Militarys initial deployment of troops was wholly defensive. They would not initiate hostilities, but they would defend themselves, the kingdom of Saudi Arabia and other friends in the Persian Gulf. The U.S. National Security Strategy was to impose economic sanctions on Iraq. On August 6, 1990, the U.N. Security Council voted in favor of resolution 661, which imposed a trade and financial Embargo of Iraq. While the Army was on the defensive the Navy and the Coast Guard immediately went on the operational and tactical offensive to create and enforce a Naval blockade against Iraq. One of the major points of contention was whether economic sanctions alone could have achieved U.S. objectives in the Gulf. U.S. senator Sam Nunn believed that international sanctions were, indeed, having a devastating effect on Iraqs economy, for two basic reasons. The Iraqi economy is based on oil, which accounts for about 50 percent of the countrys GNP and almost 100 percent of the countrys hard currency earnings. International sanctions had cut off more than 90 percent of Iraqs imports, and almost 100 percent of Iraqs exports, including virtually all of Iraqi oil exports (Dudley 79). The Bush administration countered that if we wait for sanctions to work, Kuwait will further b e victimized. According to Washington Posts Bob Woodward, the Bush administration had